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Obesity, Earnings, Skills, and Health among 450,000 Swedish Men
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The negative association between obesity and labor market outcomes has been widely 
documented, yet little is known about the mechanisms through which the association arises. 
Using rich and unique data on 450,000 Swedish men enlisting for the military, we find that the 
crude obesity penalty in earnings, which amounts to about 18 percent, is linked to supply-
side characteristics that are associated with both earnings and obesity. In particular, we show 
that the penalty reflects negative associations between obesity, on the one hand, and 
cognitive skills, non-cognitive skills, and physical fitness, on the other. Our results suggest 
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1. Introduction 
There has been a dramatic increase in the prevalence of overweight and obesity in most 
Western Countries during the last couple of decades (WHO, 2000). According to the 
World Health Organization, there were about 1.6 billion overweight and 400 million 
obese adults in the world in 2005 and these figures are believed to increase to about 2.3 
billion and 700 million, respectively, in 2015 (WHO, 2006). In the U.S., the country most 
associated with the increase in obesity, the share of obese individuals has increased from 
15 percent in the late 1970s to 31 percent at the turn of the millennium (Cawley, 2004). 
Although starting at a lower level, Sweden, which is the country at focus in this study, is 
no exception and the share of obese individuals has risen from 5 to 10 percent during the 
same time span, while the share being classified as overweight has increased from a 
quarter to about a third (Kallings, 2002).
1,2 A similar increase in weight has occurred 
among Swedish 18 year old male enlistees, for whom the share being overweight and 
obese has increased from 6 and 1 percent, respectively, in 1971, to 13 and 4 percent, 
respectively, in 1997 (Rasmussen et al., 2000).
3    
The rapid increase in overweight and obesity has raised major public health concerns, 
since evidence links overweight and obesity to serious health problems, such as 
cardiovascular disease, diabetes and some cancer forms, as well as to low fertility and 
fecundity (e.g. Dixon, 2010; Despres, 2006; Calle et al., 2003; Gregg et al, 2007; Norman 
and Clarke, 1998; Jokela et al., 2008; Sallmén et al., 2006).   
Accompanying the world-wide increase in overweight and obesity, a growing body of 
literature analyzes the association between body weight and labor market outcomes, such 
as earnings, wages, and employment. Extensive evidence from the U.S. suggests that 
there is a substantial obesity penalty in wages for women, whereas the results for men are 
weaker and more mixed (see e.g. Averett and Korenman, 1996; Behrman and 
                                                 
1 Body Mass Index (BMI) is calculated as the person’s weight (in kilograms) divided by the square of 
his/her height (in meters). A person is classified as overweight if his BMI is between 25 and 30 and as 
obese if his BMI exceeds 30. 
2 See Brunello, Michaud and Sanz-de-Galdeano (2008) for the obesity share among other European 
countries. 
3 Swedish men who enlisted for the army during the time period 1984-1997 constitute the study population 
in this paper. The share of overweight and obese individuals in this data is 10 and 2 percent, respectively.   2
Rosenzweig, 2001: Cawley, 2004; Conley and Glauber, 2006; Han et al. 2009). Studies 
on European data confirm this picture (e.g. Lundborg et al. 2006; Brunello and 
D’Hombres, 2007).  
The estimated associations between obesity and earnings are economically 
significant. The results in Cawley (2004), for instance, suggest that a difference in weight 
of 2 standard deviations among white females is associated with a difference in wages of 
9 percent, which is equivalent to the wage effect of 1.5 years of education or 3 years of 
work experience. Similar results are reported on European data, where obese women are 
found to earn 10 percent less on average than non-obese women (Lundborg et al. 2006). 
If the estimated gap represents a causal effect of obesity on wages, the ongoing obesity 
epidemic could well be expected to influence economic development and growth 
worldwide in a non-negligible manner. 
While the magnitude of the association between obesity and wages for men is still 
uncertain, even less is known about the core mechanisms through which such an 
association arises. The obesity penalty may reflect pure taste-based discrimination, 
health-related absenteeism, wages affecting obesity
4, or the influence of certain 
underlying personal labor supply side characteristics that are linked to both productivity 
and obesity. Rooth (2009) found strong indications of discrimination
5 against obese 
workers by measuring employer callbacks on fictitious job applications to real jobs, 
where pictures of an obese or non-obese person were randomly assigned to similar 
applications.
6 This type of field experiments guarantees that the researcher has the same 
information about the worker as the employer and any difference in callback between an 
obese and non-obese person must therefore result from the randomly assigned picture. 
Although providing strong evidence on discrimination, it is not possible to disentangle 
                                                 
4 For instance through low-wage workers’ consumption of cheap, fattening food. 
5 Although discriminating between people on the grounds of weight is lawful in Sweden, we still use the 
term  discrimination instead of differential treatment to comply with the jargon in the economic 
discrimination theories being discussed.   
6 The callback rate was significantly lower (about seven percentage points) for the obese applicants, which 
is clearly indicative of the existence of discrimination already in the earliest stages of the hiring process.   3
whether the result reflects taste-based discrimination or statistical discrimination.
7 
Improved knowledge on the underlying mechanisms would improve our understanding of 
why obese people often seem to earn less and could therefore be informative for policy-
makers evaluating various public health measures. 
In this paper, we focus on obesity status among men prior to entering the labor market 
and show that the obesity penalty arises mainly from supply-side productive 
characteristics that are associated with both obesity and earnings. In particular, we build 
on recent evidence of a negative association between obesity, on the one hand, and 
cognitive skills, non-cognitive skills, and physical fitness, on the other. Our results show 
that the lower cognitive and non-cognitive skills of obese people explain a large part of 
the obesity earnings penalty of about 18 percent but that an even larger part is explained 
by the lower physical fitness that accompanies obesity. Accounting for both skills and 
fitness, we are able to explain virtually the entire obesity penalty. To the extent that 
obesity is a marker of skills and fitness, our results suggest that employers statistically 
discriminate against obese workers.    
We base our analyses on a unique large-scale military enlistment data set covering 
450,000 Swedish men that underwent mandatory enlistment at age 18 during the years 
1984-1997. Since the data was collected during a period when enlistment was mandatory 
in Sweden, the data covers more or less all Swedish men that were about 18 during this 
period. In order to study the association between obesity and earnings, we have further 
linked this data set to tax authority register data on earnings and parental information. 
Important for our purposes, the enlistment data contains information on weight and 
height, physical fitness, and cognitive and non-cognitive test scores, which are all 
measured in advance of entrance to the labor market. We are also able to identify 145,000 
                                                 
7 In relation to this, it is interesting to note that in a survey conducted by the largest newspaper in Sweden, 
nine out of ten managers believed that employment decisions do depend upon the applicant’s obesity status 
(Dagens Nyheter 2003). A major reason for this belief was that obese applicants were expected to be less 
productive, highlighting the role of statistical discrimination against obese people in hiring decisions. Later, 
Agerström, Carlsson, and Rooth (2007) found similar results for Swedish managers using implicit attitude 
testing.   4
siblings in the data, which we exploit in order to account for unobserved heterogeneity at 
the family-level. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the 
evidence for a negative association between obesity, on the one hand, and cognitive 
skills, non-cognitive skills, and physical fitness, on the other, and discuss possible 
reasons for these associations. In section 3, the data is described and Section 4 discusses 
our empirical method. Section 5 then presents the results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
Skills and obesity  
Our paper is related to a recent literature that highlights the importance of cognitive and 
non-cognitive skills for labor market outcomes in the developed world (Cawley et al., 
2001; Heckman et al., 2006; Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001; Thomas and Strauss, 1997). 
Recently, variations in such supply side characteristics have been found to explain 
important parts of the observed height premium in wages and earnings (Persico et al 
2004; Case and Paxson 2008, Lundborg et al. 2009). Whether such characteristics also 
explain important parts of the obesity penalty has to our knowledge not been thoroughly 
investigated before. 
From this perspective, it is interesting to note that there is a growing literature finding 
evidence of a negative association between obesity and cognitive ability. The association 
has been indicated very early in the life span, i.e. among 2-3 years old children, 
controlling for a wide range of child, parent, and family characteristics (Cawley and 
Spiess 2008). Several different biological and socially orientated explanations for the 
association between obesity and cognitive skills have been proposed. Some researchers 
believe that overweight and obesity may cause physiologic brain changes that could 
impair general cognitive function or performance in some cognitive areas (Gustafson et 
al. 2003; Gustafson 2004).
8 Another explanation is that obesity leads to less skill 
acquisition due to discrimination by teachers or classmates or because of obesity-related 
illness episodes. Yet other explanations focus on common genetic, environmental, or 
                                                 
8 According to the cited studies, this may happen through subclinical inflammatory changes, vascular 
changes, or dysmyelinization of white matter.   5
biologic factors that could play a role in the development of both cognitive ability and 
overweight and obesity. Poor early life conditions and/or parental background may for 
instance affect both subsequent body size as well as cognitive skills.  
While there is no consensus in the literature on the mechanisms underlying the 
negative association between skills and obesity, it is interesting to note that the 
association appears very early in life, before school entry. This suggests that the 
association is not purely driven by discrimination of obese children by teachers or class-
mates, even though some evidence for this exists as well (see e.g. Puhl and Latner 2006). 
Irrespective of the exact mechanisms underlying the relationship between obesity and 
cognitive skills, a prospective employer may use obesity as a marker for cognitive ability. 
For the employer, it matters less if obesity causally affects cognitive ability, if it is the 
other way around, or if both are driven by some third underlying variable, such as 
genetics or family background. In any case, the employer may use obesity to statistically 
discriminate. Thus, from the perspective of improving the understanding of labour market 
discrimination against obese people, the exact mechanisms behind the association 
between obesity and cognitive ability is of less concern. Instead, we simply note that 
given the negative relationship between obesity and cognitive skills, a reasonable 
hypothesis is that part of the obesity earnings penalty may reflect the lower cognitive 
ability that follow with obesity.  
Besides cognitive ability, the recent labor economics literature has paid growing 
attention to the role of so called non-cognitive skills. In the literature, these type of skills 
essentially describes a range of personal characteristics potentially affecting productivity, 
but distinct from cognitive skills, such as motivation, self-confidence, sociability (the 
capability of interacting and working with others), persistence, time preference (the 
ability or will to postpone instant pleasures in favor of future returns), and charm. It is 
uncontroversial to presume that non-cognitive abilities are valued by employers, 
coworkers and potential customers in almost any kind of occupation. Indeed, this is what 
a recent body of research has shown, linking non-cognitive skills to various 
socioeconomic outcomes (see e.g. Heckman and Rubinstein 2001; Heckman et al 2006). 
In fact, some studies suggest that non-cognitive skills are at least as important as   6
cognitive skill in determining earnings and employment (Heckman 2008; Heckman et al. 
2006; Borghans et al. 2008).  
A recent literature has also linked non-cognitive skills to overweight and obesity. This 
relationship has been relatively less attributed to biological processes and more to social 
processes.
9 For instance, if overweight and obese people are excluded from non-cognitive 
skill building relations, activities and environments, there is a clear connection between 
obesity and this type of skills.  
Evidence in Cawley and Spiess (2008) provides evidence of a link between obesity 
and social skills as early as ages 2-3.
  According to the authors, there are several 
underlying mechanisms by which this finding could be explained. It may be that children 
who lack social skills get fewer friends and therefore play less, which increases the risk 
of obesity. Alternatively, children who are stigmatized for their obesity do not get the 
opportunities to develop their social skills. Well in line with this reasoning, Cramer and 
Steinwert (1998) found that obese children are viewed as less desirable playmates among 
3 year olds. Similar mechanisms may obviously be at work at older ages when it comes to 
relations with e.g. partners, employers, customers, and coworkers.  
In a parallel vein of research, Persico et al. (2004) found that teen height explains a 
large part of the height premium in earnings, and that the premium is reduced when 
controlling for participation in high school sports and clubs. This caused them to 
conclude that participation in such activities shapes non-cognitive skills. If this is true, it 
does not seem farfetched to suggest that obesity, presumably being connected to low 
levels of participation in sports and related activities, may also be related to low 
accumulation of non-cognitive skills.  
There is thus substantial evidence linking non-cognitive skills to both socio-economic 
outcomes and obesity. Given these associations, it is straightforward to formulate a 
hypothesis where part of the obesity penalty in earnings is reflecting the lower non-
cognitive skills of obese people, in a similar vein as with cognitive skills.   
 
                                                 
9 An exception is Cortese et al. (2008), who argue that poor control of neural centers that are related to 
traits such as impulsivity and addictive tendencies could damage the control of food intake, possibly 
leading to overeating and subsequent overweight and obesity.    7
Obesity, physical fitness, and health 
Besides mental skills, i.e. cognitive and non-cognitive skills, obese people may also differ 
from non-obese people regarding physical skills. It is well known that obese people in 
general are less physically fit and less healthy than non-obese people. For instance, 
obesity increases the risk of coronary heart disease (Willett, 1995), type 2 diabetes 
(Colditz,1995), stroke and some types of cancer (Michaud, 2001). At the same time, there 
are several reasons to believe that physical fitness and health are rewarded traits on the 
labor market. Firstly, people in good physical shape may be more productive at work, 
work longer hours, and may be less on sick-leave. Such arguments are consistent with 
findings that link physical fitness, often measured through cardiorespiratory fitness (see 
the data section for a discussion), to a diminished risk of coronary artery disease, 
myocardial infarction, and all-cause mortality (see e.g. Metter et al. 2002; Gale et al. 
2007; Wijndaele et al. 2007; Rowland, 2007).
10 Employers may thus use obesity as a 
marker of long-run health and productivity in order to statistically discriminate. In line 
with this, numerous studies have documented a link between health and labor market 
outcomes, which is also suggestive of a positive association between physical fitness and 
labor market outcomes (see e.g Currie and Madrian 1999 for an overview).  
Secondly, physical fitness may signal other traits that are valued on the labor market. 
Cardiovascular fitness, for instance, requires regular physical activity and a balanced diet 
and may hence be associated with personality traits, such as self-control, temperance, 
planning capabilities, endurance and patience, etc., thus coinciding with certain 
dimensions of non-cognitive skills. It should also be noted that there is a small but 
growing literature showing that individuals being engaged in leisure sport activities 
receive higher wages (see e.g. Lechner 2009 and the references therein, and Rooth 2010).  
                                                 
10 It is not fully known why the body’s capacity to transport oxygen to exercising muscles should have a 
positive effect on a range of health outcomes [US Department of Health and Human Services, 1996]. It has 
been hypothesized that the influence of cardiorespiratory fitness may be a direct one, through enhanced 
peripheral vascular reactivity or myocardial vascularisation, inhibition of thrombosis, or reduced risk of 
arrhythmias with higher cardiorespiratory fitness mitigating the effects of atherosclerotic vascular disease. 
An alternative hypothesis is that an expanded cardiovascular system and improved oxygen delivery may 
depress risk factors for cardiovascular disease. Yet an alternative hypothesis is that both cardiorespiratory 
fitness and health are affected independently by some third factor, such as genes or family environment.   8
To sum up, there is extensive evidence linking obesity to cognitive skills, non-
cognitive skills, and physical fitness, and health. The same set of traits has been shown to 
be important determinants of labor market outcomes in a large number of studies. In our 
empirical analyses, we will therefore consider to what extent the observed obesity 
earnings penalty is explained by these respective types of traits.   
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
Our empirical analysis is based on a data set constructed by integrating registers from 
Statistics Sweden (SCB) and the Swedish National Service Administration. The latter 
contains information on every individual living in Sweden in the year 1999 who enlisted 
for the military between 1984 and 1997.
11 Our study population consists of all males who 
were 28-38 years old in 2003, who enlisted for the military, and for whom there is full 
information on relevant variables. Enlisting for the military is carried out during a two-
day procedure and is mandatory for all male Swedish citizens the year they turn 18. Only 
persons with severe handicaps, institutionalized persons (both due to mental disorders or 
being in prison), or persons living abroad are exempted from enlisting.
12 It should also be 
noted that a refusal to enlist results in fines, and eventually in imprisonment. In order to 
avoid any confounding influence of ethnic discrimination, we restrict our analyses to 
native Swedish males, i.e., those born in Sweden to Swedish-born parents.
13 Given these 
restrictions, our study population covers about 92 percent of the total native male 
Swedish population in the relevant cohorts. 
Our base sample consists of 468,312 individuals. Out of these, 96 percent had 
positive annual earnings in 2003, i.e., 448,702 individuals, which is the sample that we 
use in our analyses. Hence, there is very little attrition in the data and it more or less 
                                                 
11 The individuals had to live in Sweden during 1999, since many important variables, e.g. the enlistment 
information and the family information, are collected for the 1999 population data. 
12 Since the persons in our sample enlisted during the years 1984-1997, and since earnings are followed up 
in 2003, this implies that we lose a small number of people due to death and emigration. There is no 
information available on why a particular individual did not enlist. 
13 Moreover, non-native ethnic groups have a much lower participation rate for enlisting since only about 
fifty percent (or less) are Swedish citizens, making selective participation an issue for these groups.   9
covers the entire native born male Swedish population. In some parts of the analysis, we 
instead focus on variation between siblings, which reduces the sample being analyzed to 
145,210 individuals. Since the enlistment variables are measured by military personnel, 
and earnings by tax authorities, our results are not influenced by any reporting bias, 
which often plagues survey data. 
Our measure of annual earnings includes income from work, self-employed income 
and social insurance benefits such as sickness benefits, child allowance and parental 
benefits for the year 2003 and is taken from the tax records. A sensitivity analysis 
conducted in Section 4.2.2, where only income from work and self-employed income is 
included in the measure of earnings, shows that the inclusion of social insurance benefits 
does not affect our results. 
Cognitive skills are measured using a test similar in style to the AFQT in the US. The 
test is called the Enlistment Battery 80 and includes four separate tests; Instructions, 
Synonyms, Metal Folding and Technical Comprehension. The separate scores of these 
tests are aggregated into a standard composite measure calculated by the military 
enlistment service, which we also use in the analyses. The measure ranges from 1 to 9.
14  
Non-cognitive skills are measured through interviews carried out by certified 
psychologists employed by the Swedish army. The ultimate purpose of the interview is to 
evaluate the conscript’s ability to perform military service and to function in a war 
situation. This is achieved through an assessment of the enlistee’s psychological stability 
and endurance, capability of taking initiatives, responsibility, and social competence. The 
assessment results in a composite enlistment score of non-cognitive skills, ranging from 1 
to 9, which we standardize and use in our analyses. 
Though the original purpose of the non-cognitive skill measure used here is to 
evaluate peoples’ suitability to serve in a war situation, it seems reasonable to assume that 
the character traits valued by the military psychologists (psychological stability and 
endurance, capability of taking initiatives, responsibility and social competence etc.) may 
also be appreciated and rewarded in the labor market. Indeed, this is what we find in the 
empirical analysis. 
                                                 
14 The general intelligence factor, G, is the variable used in this study. For more information about the G 
factor, see Caroll (1993).   10
Our main measure of physical fitness is cardiovascular fitness. This is measured as 
the maximum resistance attained in watts when riding on a stationary bike during a 
specific time period (around 5 minutes).
15 The measure is often denoted as Maximum 
Working Capacity (MWC) and has been found to be an important predictor of mortality 
among healthy men (e.g. Sandvik et al. 1993). Note also that this measure is closely 
related to maximum oxygen consumption (VO2max), which has been labeled as the 
single best measure of cardiovascular capacity and maximal aerobic power (Hyde and 
Gengenbach 2007).
16 A correlation of 0.9 between the two measures has been reported in 
the literature and it has therefore been concluded that MWC provides a suitable measure 
of cardiovascular capacity (Patton et al. 1982). 
Since individual needs for energy vary with body size, our measure of maximum 
oxygen consumption is expressed relative to body weight. Evidence also suggests that 
obesity is not related to maximum oxygen consumption in absolute terms but have a 
strong effect on consumption per kg body weight, which is usually considered to be the 
best indicator of physical fitness.
17 Physical strength is captured by the maximum 
pressure exerted squeezing a bar by the strongest hand. Measurement of handgrip 
strength is a valid indicator of, and commonly used to assess, overall muscle strength 
(e.g. Metter et al. 2002, Gale et al. 2007).  
In order to construct our indicators of being underweight, normal weight, overweight, 
or obese, we use information on Body Mass Index (BMI, see also footnote 1). Generally, 
a BMI (for men) ranging between 25 and 30 is usually thought to reflect “overweight”, 
                                                 
15 In the cycle ergonometry test, the subject was instructed to maintain pedal cadence between 60 and 70 
rpm. The test was initiated with 5 min of submaximal exercise at work rates of 75 to 175 W, depending on 
expected fitness. The work rate was then continuously increased by 25 W/min until volitional exhaustion. 
In the end, the final work rate (Wmax) was recorded. For more details on the test procedure, see Lundborg 
et al. (2009).  
16 Directly measuring maximum oxygen consumption is costly and time-consuming, meaning that indirect 
measures are often preferred when large numbers of people are being tested.  
17 In contrast, absolute maximum oxygen consumption was shown by Lundborg et al. (2009) to explain a 
large share of the observed height premium in earnings. In the case of height, there are physical reasons to 
expect an association between height and maximum oxygen consumption in absolute terms, see Lundborg 
et al. (2009).   11
whereas men with BMIs exceeding 30 are considered to be “obese”. When it comes to 
“normal weight”, the upper bound of 25 is commonly used whereas the definitions of the 
lower bound varies somewhat. Most previous studies on labour market outcomes define 
normal weight within the range 20-25, and low weight below 20, whereas the World 
Health Organization uses a lower bound of 18.5 for their “normal” weight definition 
(WHO 2006). In this study we employ the former definition yielding four BMI categories 
of low (<20), normal (20-25), over-weight (25-30), and obese (>30). 
It should be noted that there are no strong incentives to underperform deliberately at 
the enlistment tests. The reason is that, for our study sample, the results of the tests had 
no impact on the probability of doing military service or not, since almost all people that 
enlisted during our study period also completed military service. Instead, the test results 
merely influenced the individual’s placement within the army, meaning that poorer 
results typically led to a less qualified and meriting placement. We will however perform 
some sensitivity tests in order to examine if suspiciously low scores on the tests have any 
impact on our results.  
For some of the explanatory variables there is missing information. This is most 
common for parental education and income for which information is missing for at most 
12-13 percent of the sample. When there is missing information in a variable for an 
individual, we have imputed the individual’s data with the sample variable mean and 
created an additional binary variable indicator taking on the value one when information 
is missing and zero otherwise. The same procedure is followed for non-cognitive skill 
and the physical capacity enlistment variables.
18    
 
***  Table 3.1 about here *** 
 
Descriptive statistics  
In Table 3.1 we show descriptive statistics on the key variables used in the empirical 
analysis, subdivided by BMI-class. The main picture that emerges is that men of normal 
weight on average earn more than overweight or obese men. The raw differences are 
                                                 
18 For these last three variables less than 0.1 percent of the population has missing information.    12
quite large and a normal-weight man earns about 21% more than an obese man.
19 
Overweight and obese men also fare worse when it comes to cognitive and non-cognitive 
skills and measures of cardiovascular fitness and muscular strength.  
The bivariate associations between earnings in 2003, skills and cardiovascular fitness 
on the one hand and BMI (at age 18) on the other, for the full sample are illustrated in 
figures 1-5. The pattern of log earnings along the BMI distribution is inversely J-shaped, 
with earnings peaking at a BMI-level of 22, which is in the midst of our “normal weight” 
BMI range, and decreases thereafter (see Fig 1). Men with a BMI score of about 21-23 on 
average earn about 15-16% more than people who are of very low weight (BMI of about 
15-16) or just obese (BMI of about 30).  
 
*** Figure 1 about here *** 
 
The connection between cognitive skills and BMI follows a similar pattern but peaks 
at a lower BMI-level of 20 (see Fig 2).  The inverse J-shape is in this case rather 
symmetrical around the peak BMI level of 20, i.e. men with BMI-levels 15 and 25 on 
average having similar cognitive skill test scores (of about 4.85-4-90), and obese men 
scoring lower (below 4.5). This could be contrasted to the association between earnings 
and BMI, where overweight men earn more and just obese men (BMI 30) earn about as 
much as people with very low weight (BMI: 15-16). 
The relationship between non-cognitive skill and BMI is inversely U-shaped, this 
type of skill reaching its’ maximum at normal weight BMI of about 22-23, mildly obese, 
and men of very low weight scoring similar test values (see fig 3).  
 
*** Figure 2 about here *** 
*** Figure 3 about here *** 
 
Turning to physical fitness, cardiovascular fitness is constant up to a BMI level of 21, 
but decreases rather linearly and steeply through the rest of the BMI span (fig 4). 
                                                 
19 Mean logarithm earnings for men of normal and obese BMI are 12.35 and 12.16, respectively.    13
Muscular strength is positively related to BMI up to a BMI level of about 25 (see fig 5). 
At higher BMI levels, muscular strength is rather constant. 
Hence, in bivariate analyses, there is a connection between BMI and earnings, and 
also between BMI, on the one hand, and physical as well as cognitive and non-cognitive 
capabilities, on the other. In the empirical section, we will try to unravel whether, and to 
what extent, these capabilities may be associated with the observed obesity penalty in 
earnings.  
 
*** Figure 4 about here *** 
*** Figure 5 about here *** 
 
Method 
In our empirical specification, we follow Neal and Johnson (1996) and only include 
variables determined in advance of entering the labor market. Controlling for factors like 
occupation, post-secondary education, and marital status may result in an underestimation 
of the obesity penalty, if part of it works through obese people sorting themselves into 
certain occupations, education levels or marital statuses.
20 Our main earnings 
specifications therefore only include our measures of skills and physical capacity together 
with parental characteristics, such as education and earnings. Equation 1 shows the model 
being estimated for the total population data using ordinary least squares: 
 
1)  lnyi = a + b*Wi + c*Xi + d*Fi + ei, 
 
where  lnyi denotes log earnings for individual i,  Wi  is a vector of dummy variables 
indicating underweight, normal weight, overweight, and obesity, X is a vector of controls 
for the individual characteristics measured when enlisting, and F a vector of the parental 
characteristics. The model is altered by including different sets of variables into X. Our 
second specification controls for unobserved family and parental characteristics by 
estimating a sibling fixed effects model:  
 
                                                 
20 A similar argument was put forth by Case and Paxson (2008), analysing the height premium in earnings.    14
2)   lnyij = a + bWij + c*Xij + fj + eij 
 
where ij is an index for individual i in family j and fj represents family fixed effects 
capturing family characteristics common to all siblings within the same family, while eij 
represent an individual specific error term. Identification of the coefficient b thus relies 
upon sibling variation in BMI classification at age 18. In this specification, the estimate 
of b should not be subject to any bias due to the influence of family-level unobservable 
factors. 
In our OLS regressions, we control for age fixed effects, which picks up any non-
linearity in the age profile for earnings but also any changes in the measurement of the 
enlistment variables from year to year. Since 99 percent of the conscripts enlisted at age 
18 or 19 (86 and 13 percent, respectively) the age fixed effects also pick up anything 
specific for the year the conscript enlisted. It is therefore reassuring that the results are 
insensitive to how we handle the age and age-when-enlisting variables, that is, including 
additional controls for age (fixed effects) when enlisting, or only including a control for 
linear age, does not change the results at all.  
   15
4. Results 
4.1 Explaining the obesity penalty 
4.1.1 Results for the total population data 
We start out with the full set of 448,667 observations, including only our BMI 
classification and age as explanatory variables into the earnings regression (Model A in 
Table 4.1). The results indicate that obesity is associated with an earnings penalty of 18.3 
percent. The corresponding penalties for being overweight or underweight are 7.4 percent 
and 5.0 percent, respectively. The inclusion of height in the regression does not affect the 
results to any important extent (Model B).
21 Controlling for parental characteristics in the 
form of education and earnings only slightly reduces the obesity penalty to 15.4 percent 
(see Model C). Hence, the estimated penalty does not originate from variations in 
parental characteristics, as manifested by the parents’ education and income.
22  
The estimated raw obesity penalty of 18 percent is rather large. To put it into 
perspective, it could be noted that the estimated return to an additional year of schooling 
in Sweden is about 6 percent. The obesity penalty thus corresponds to three years of 
schooling, which corresponds to a university bachelor degree. While our estimated 
obesity penalty is larger than most previous estimates for males, one should keep in mind 
that we consider obesity at age 18, whereas most previous studies consider obesity at 
older ages. People who are obese already at 18 may be different from people who become 
obese at older ages. Moreover, for reasons explained in the method section, our estimate 
                                                 
21 If being overweight or obese is associated with shorter stature, one would be worried that the omission of 
height would bias the coefficient of overweight or obesity downwards. The reason is that it is well 
established that height is positively associated with earnings (see e.g. Case and Paxson 2008 and Lundborg 
et al. 2009).  
22 As discussed in Section 3 we only include variables measured before labor market entry since sorting in 
the labor market could hide some of the weight penalties in earnings. Indeed this is what we find in that 
obese and overweight individuals are sorted into more low-paying occupations. Using 115 different 
occupational groups according to SSYK (Standard for Swedish Occupational Classification), a three digit 
occupational classification code similar to the international classification (ISCO), we find that the raw 
obesity/overweight penalty of eighteen and seven percent is reduced to seven and two percent, respectively, 
when measuring the average penalty within occupations. We also found evidence of sorting by (more) 
weight into (less) years of schooling, but to a much lesser degree (a penalty of twelve and four percent for 
obese and overweight, respectively). These results are available upon request.   16
explicitly allow for sorting of obese people into certain educational tracks and 
occupations, where previous estimates often condition on such factors.   
We next turn our attention to the supply side characteristics, where we expand Model 
C by including these characteristics one by one (Model D – G) and finally all of them 
together (Model H). The row denoted “Reduction (%) in original (Model C) obesity 
penalty” contains information about how much the estimated obesity penalty is decreased 
in each Model D through H in comparison with Model C.  
First, controlling for cognitive skills reduces the obesity penalty by one fifth, or from 
15.3 percent to 12.2 percent (Model D). Cognitive skills are also clearly related to 
earnings, as a one standard deviation increase in the score is associated with 10.5 percent 
higher/lower earnings. Second, we control for non-cognitive skills, which more than 
halves the raw obesity penalty to 7.2 percent. Non-cognitive skills are in themselves an 
even more important predictors of earnings than cognitive skills and a one standard 
deviation increase in non-cognitive skills increases earnings with 13.3 percent (Model E). 
At the other end of the BMI-distribution, it is interesting to note that the earnings penalty 
for being underweight is practically eliminated when controlling for non-cognitive skills. 
Accounting for both cognitive and non-cognitive skills reduces the obesity penalty by 
58% (not shown). 
We then turn to our measures of physical fitness. Starting out with cardiovascular 
fitness, (Model F), it is evident that though this variable is less connected to earnings 
overall (a one standard deviation hereof increasing earnings by about 4.1 percent), it 
virtually wipes out the estimated obesity penalty (which is now only 0.1 percent). 
Muscular strength does not have a similar impact (Model G). Controlling for this type of 
capability actually slightly increases the obesity penalty to 16.2 percent.  
In model H, we then include all personal supply side characteristics (last column of 
table 3.1). Comparing the results with the previously estimated models, a notable feature 
is the relative similarity between the results for the obesity parameter values obtained in 
Model H and F (in which cardiovascular fitness was the only personal supply side 
characteristic included). The estimated obesity penalties in the two models are amounting 
to 2.7 percent and 0.1 percent respectively. It could also be noted that all the original BMI 
gradient parameters in earnings (model C) is reduced by more than 80 percent in   17
accounting for the entire set of personal characteristics (model H). Hence, four fifths of 
the observed obesity gradient in earnings could be predicted from supply side 
characteristics measured at age 18. 
 
*** Table 4.1 *** 
  
4.1.2 Results for siblings 
The results presented so far do not take into account that, apart from parental earnings 
and education, there may be other unobserved family level factors governing the 
enlistees’ future earnings, obesity and mental and physical skills. It seems likely that 
these traits, to some extent, are influenced by biological predispositions, social values, 
family traditions, and norms. Moreover, it is possible that some of the personal 
characteristics studied here are more associated with family background than others. To 
control for such family-specific effects, the models in the previous section was re-
estimated on the 145,193 brothers in the sample (see Table 4.2).  
First, in order to examine whether our sibling sample is comparable to our main 
sample, we estimate the raw obesity penalty, without imposing sibling fixed effects. As 
shown in Model A in Table 4.2, the resulting estimate, 17 percent, is very similar to the 
corresponding gradient obtained for the full sample. Introducing sibling fixed effects, 
however, (see Model B in table 4.2) reduces the obesity penalty to 9 percent. This 
suggests that factors operating at the family-level explain almost half (47%) of the raw 
obesity penalty in earnings.  
As in the main sample, adding height (Model C) to the regression leaves the obesity 
premium unaltered. In model D, we then add cognitive skills, which reduce the obesity 
penalty by about one sixth to 7.6 percent. Whereas non-cognitive skill (Model E) has a 
similar impact on earnings (9.2 percent) as for the full sample, its inclusion now reduces 
the obesity penalty by more than 40 percent (to 5.2 percent). Accounting for both 
cognitive and non-cognitive skills gives a reduction in the obesity penalty of 46 percent. 
Model F then includes our measure of cardiovascular fitness, which again in essence 
eliminates the estimated overweight and obesity penalties, which now amounts to 0.1 
percent and 0.2 percent, respectively. This implies that these penalties are reduced by 
about 98% when cardiovascular fitness is controlled for. As in the full sample, muscular   18
strength does not reduce the overweight and obesity penalties in earnings (model G). The 
full model H again renders the estimated penalties of underweight, overweight, and 
obesity insignificant. To summarize, the results obtained for the full sample are robust to 
the inclusion of family fixed effects. Next, in order to further check the robustness of our 
results, we turn to a number of different sensitivity analyses.  
 
*** Table 4.2 *** 
 
4.2 Sensitivity analysis 
 
4.2.1 Sensitivity analysis of the impact of different earnings definitions 
We start our sensitivity analyses by considering to what extent our results are sensitive to 
our measure of earnings. In particular, we examine whether or not the results are sensitive 
to the existence of extreme earnings, low earnings (below a 100’ SEK), and the exclusion 
of sickness benefits. In these analyses, the sibling sample is used and a comparison is 
made to the obesity penalty estimated in Models C and H of Table 4.2. The results are 
presented in Table 4.3.  
 
*** Table 4.3 *** 
 
Top coded earnings 
In the first column (i) of Table 4.3, the estimates from Table 4.2 (Model C and H) are 
replicated. The second column (ii) then shows the corresponding estimates when annual 
earnings have been top coded to 500’ SEK.
23 The BMI gradients in earnings resulting 
from this restriction are strikingly similar to the original ones, indicating that a skewed 
distribution of extremely high earnings towards people of normal weight is not driving 
the results of Section 4.2.  
 
                                                 
23 This corresponds to about 50,000 Euros.   19
Hourly wage or hours worked? 
Annual earnings are the product of hours spent working during the year and the hourly 
wage rate. The structure of the data used here does not allow us to directly assess to what 
extent the estimated weight penalties in earnings is originating from variations in wage or 
hours of work. It has previously been shown by Antelius and Björklund (2000), however, 
that by excluding earnings below a threshold value of 100,000 SEK (approximately 
10,000 euro) when analyzing annual earnings based on tax records in Sweden, one 
receives a return to education similar to the one obtained from analyzing hourly wages. 
Under the assumption that this result can be generalised to the present study, estimating 
the models including only those whose earnings are above 100,000 SEK should yield a 
weight penalty that more closely reflects the corresponding penalty in the wage rate. 
Under this presumption we conducted a sensitivity analysis excluding those with earnings 
below 100,000 SEK (12,312 individuals, or 8 percent, of the sample, see column (iii) of 
Table 4.5). This procedure indeed yielded weight penalties that are less pronounced. In 
model C, the exclusion of those with low earnings reduces the obesity penalty from 9.1 to 
4.8 percent. This may indicate that part of the obesity penalty in earnings is due to larger 
fractions of obese men spending relatively fewer hours working or alternatively that the 
association between obesity and earnings is more pronounced for low earners. The latter 
interpretation is supported by results from (unconditional) quantile regressions on the 
total data, using only the weight indicators and age as regressors. The obesity penalty is -
0.38, -0.26, -0.15, -0.12, -0.15, -0.20, and -0.222, respectively, for the 5th, 10th, 25th, 
Median, 75th, 90th and 95th percentiles. Hence, the penalty is greater at the top/bottom 
deciles, but quite stable in the interquartile range of the earnings distribution. The 
corresponding estimates for the overweight penalty are -0.09, -0.09, -0.05, -0.05, -0.07, -
0.10, and -0.11, respectively. In model H, the results do not change to any important 
extent when imposing the earnings restriction and the results are still insignificant. 
 
Earning subsidies 
As discussed above, obesity correlates with health. Hence, obesity-related differentials in 
earnings may to some extent capture variations in health and health related absenteeism 
from work. In the analyses in Section 4.1 and 4.2, we therefore used an earnings measure   20
including sickness benefits, which, given the universality and relative generosity of the 
Swedish welfare system, mitigates some of the earnings differences that stems from 
sickness leave variations. In order to check the sensitivity of our results from the 
inclusion of sickness benefits, we re-ran our regressions with an earnings measure this 
time excluding subsidies, i.e. only including labour and/or self employed income. This 
implied that a smaller fraction of the population, 1,686 individuals, was excluded since 
their earnings consisted solely of such benefits. As shown in column (iv) of Table 4.3, the 
exclusion of such subsidies only slightly inflated the raw obesity penalty in earnings, 
compared with column (i), from 9.1 percent to 11.1 percent. For the full model (H) a 
similar pattern was found, exclusion of subsidies somewhat inflating the obesity penalty 
and reducing the other parts of the BMI gradient in earnings. Hence, no important 
changes in the results emerged from the exclusion/inclusion of sickness benefits.  
 
Enlistment “fakers” 
We next address the possibility that some people may underperform during the various 
enlistment tests. One reason may be that people believe that they will be able to escape 
from certain positions in the army by performing poorly on the tests. For instance, those 
scoring above average on the cognitive test were evaluated on leadership skills and 
therefore ran the risk (or chance) of serving more months in a leadership position. Hence, 
in order to minimize the risk of being appointed to a higher rank and longer duty, a 
strategy could be to deliberately score low on the cognitive test. Note however that 
performing poorly would not make it possible for the individual to skip military service 
and would only affect the positions reached with poorer test scores leading to less 
qualified positions. In that sense, the incentives to underperform are somewhat weak. If 
the propensity to underperform does vary with BMI, however, our results may be biased. 
Although we find this scenario somewhat unlikely, we checked the sensitivity of our 
results by excluding very low test scores. Thus, we excluded every enlistee scoring a 1 or 
a 2 on the cognitive test (14151 individuals or 10% of the original sibling sample), and 
re-ran our analysis. It should be stressed that the distribution of expected test scores do 
cover the full range of possible values (1-9) and it is not necessarily so that very low 
scores reflect deliberate underperformance. Compared with column (i), the results of   21
column (v) for both model C and H indicates that whereas the earnings gap of those of 
low weight and overweight are basically unaltered, the obesity penalty is inflated 
somewhat, from 9.1 percent to 11.3 percent (Model C) and from 1.5 percent to 3.9 
percent (model H). 
 
Misclassified individuals 
Using BMI in order to categorise people into obese, overweight, etc always means a risk 
that some people will get misclassified. Some people with a BMI above 25 may be 
classified as overweight, although their BMI rather reflects a large muscle mass. Such 
misclassifications could be assumed to lead to a downward bias in the estimated obesity 
and overweight penalties, since a large muscle mass is something that should not affect 
labour market outcomes in a negative manner, but rather then opposite. We addressed this 
by excluding individuals from our analysis with an unusually large muscle mass and 
more exactly those who had a measured handgrip strength one standard deviation above 
the average handgrip strength. As shown in column (vi) of Table 4.3, this did not change 
the estimated obesity penalty. Instead, the penalty for being overweight increased 
somewhat, which is what one would expect, since some previously misclassified persons 
with large muscle mass are now taken out.  
 
Do obese people face lower returns to schooling? 
Our results could still reflect indirect preference discrimination if obese people invest less 
in schooling due to perceived discrimination. In other words, if preference discrimination 
exists, obese people would face lower returns to schooling and thus face reduced 
incentives to invest in schooling. This can be investigated by studying whether or not the 
returns to schooling in fact are less for obese people. We therefore ran models with 
interactions between our BMI-classifications and years of schooling. The coefficient of 
the interaction between obesity and schooling was small and insignificant, however, in 
both the total sample and the sibling sample.
24 We therefore do not believe that a smaller 
return to schooling for obese people is an important explanation for our findings.  
                                                 
24 The estimate of the obesity*years of schooling interaction term is -0.003 (s.e.= 0.006) using the total 
data, and -0.018 (s.e.=0.012) using only siblings.          22
Summarizing, the sensitivity analyses of this section show that the results of Section 
4.1 are quite robust. It is also indicated that part of the BMI gradient in total earnings may 
be due to less hours worked and to a higher wage penalty for low-earners. 
 
5. Summary and discussion 
By using large-scale register data, we present new evidence on the obesity earnings 
penalty. In particular, we show that the penalty arises mainly from supply-side 
characteristics that are associated with both earnings and obesity, such as cognitive skills, 
non-cognitive skills, and physical fitness. Among these characteristics, physical fitness 
explained the major part of the obesity penalty.  
Our results are consistent with the idea that employers use obesity as a marker for 
demanded skills in order to statistically discriminate. Physical fitness, which is likely to 
be related to productivity, health, and demanded personality traits, will be signaled 
through obesity status and employers, who may not have anything against obese 
individuals per se, may therefore statistically discriminate against obese people. Similar 
reasoning applies to cognitive and non-cognitive skills. This may also explain the finding 
in Rooth (2009), where job applications that signaled obesity received a significantly 
lower callback rate. Although our results are consistent with statistical discrimination, it 
is obviously impossible to completely rule out taste-based discrimination as an 
explanation for the results. However, it should be noted that the traits that we find 
“explain” the obesity penalty are traits that are widely believed to be related to 
productivity. 
Our results show that the “obesity epidemic” should clearly be of interest to 
economists interested in the determinants of labor market performance. We obtain a raw 
obesity earnings penalty of about 18 percent. To put this into perspective, the estimated 
Swedish gender earnings gap is 16 percent (Kumlin 2007) and the earnings gap for men 
born outside Europe 15 percent (le Grand and Szulkin, 2002). Moreover, the obesity 
penalty corresponds to about three years of additional schooling, equivalent to an 
ordinary university bachelor degree.  
Since our results suggest that the negative association between obesity and earnings 
runs mainly through the former’s association with physical fitness and skills, it is of   23
importance to better understand the mechanisms through which obesity is associated with 
these factors. Our data do not allow us to address the causal arrows running between 
obesity and skills. However, on a speculative basis, it could be noted that technological 
change is believed to have made the populations of Western countries fatter, through 
lower price of caloric intake and increased “price” of caloric expenditure through more 
sedentary work tasks (Lakdawalla et al. 2005).
25 To the best of our knowledge, there is no 
simultaneous technological change that would explain why some groups would also face 
declining cognitive skills and non-cognitive skills. This may provide an indication that 
the lower skills and physical fitness faced by obese people are actually caused by obesity, 
in which case the impact of obesity on overall productivity and growth may be 
substantial. An interesting route for further research is thus to analyze the extent to which 
obesity causes declines in skills and physical fitness.  
                                                 
25 The ”price” of caloric expenditure refers to the monetary costs and the time costs involved in getting rid 
of calories, through spending time at the gym and engaging in sport activities, for instance. In an industrial 
society, the individual in principle got “paid” to exercise at work, through physically demanding job tasks, 
whereas today’s jobs are mostly sedentary. The price of expending calories has thus gone up, since the 
individual now has to pay, both in terms of time and money, in order to expend calories.     24
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Figure 1. (Log) Earnings and BMI. Total population. 








Note: The dependent variable is the mean for everyone with the integer value of the independent variable, 
being truncated at 15 and 40.    30
Figure 2. Cognitive skill and BMI. Total population. 








Note: The dependent variable is the mean for everyone with the integer value of the independent variable, 
being truncated at 15 and 40.    31
Figure 3. Non-cognitive skill and BMI. Total population. 








Note: The dependent variable is the mean for everyone with the integer value of the independent variable, 
being truncated at 15 and 40.  
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Figure 4. Physical fitness (wmax/weight in kg) and BMI. Total population. 








Note: The dependent variable is the mean for everyone with the integer value of the independent variable, 
being truncated at 15 and 40.  
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Figure 5. Handgrip strength and BMI. Total population. 








Note: The dependent variable is the mean for everyone with the integer value of the independent variable, 
being truncated at 15 and 40.  
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Tables: 
 
Table 3.1. Descriptives of the population divided at BMI<20, 20<BMI<25, 25<BMI<30, and BMI>30. Men 28-38 years old, 2003. 
Total population. 
Variable <20  20-25  25-30  >30 
BMI  18.9 (0.9) 22.0 (1.3) 26.7 (1.3) 32.9 (2.9) 
Logarithm annual earnings  12.31  (0.81)  12.35  (0.78)  12.27  (0.78)  12.16  (0.84) 
          
Age  33.3 (3.1) 33.1 (3.2) 32.9 (3.2) 32.6 (3.2) 
Parental characteristics: 

















Mothers’ (log) earnings  9.81  (1.26)  9.86  (1.23)  9.80  (1.25)  9.76  (1.27) 
Fathers years of schooling  11.4  (2.3)  11.3  (2.3)  10.9  (2.0)  10.6  (1.7) 
Mothers years of schooling  11.4  (2.2)  11.4  (22)  11.0  (2.0)  10.6  (1.8) 
Cognitive skill: 





































































Height  179.8 (6.6)  179.5 (6.4)  179.2 (6.5)  179.4 (6.7) 
          
No of observations  110,859  285,913  43,117  8,778 
Notes:  Standard deviations in parentheses. The variables on cognitive skill, non-cognitive skill and physical fitness are standardized when used in the empirical 
analysis.   35
Table 4.1. Earnings and BMI. Men 28-38 years old, 2003. Logarithm of annual earnings. Total population data. 
Variable A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H 
 



























































































































































            
Age    Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Height No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Parental characteristics  No  No Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
            
Reduction (%) in original  
(Model C)  obesity penalty  
    20   53  100   -5    82  
R2  0.01 0.02  0.03  0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.06 
No of cases  448,667  448,667  448,667  448,667  448,667  448,667  448,667  448,667 
Notes: This table reports estimates from the (2) regression model: Log Earnings = a + b*BMI_class+ c*X + d*Missing info + e. Model A only 
includes BMI categories and age and is estimated using OLS. Model B adds height and Model C also adds the parental variables. Model D adds 
cognitive skill, Model E adds non-cognitive skill, while Model F and G add the physical fitness variables. Model H adds all variables.     36
Table 4.2. Earnings and BMI. Men 28-38 years old, 2003. Logarithm of annual earnings. Siblings data. 
Variable A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H 
 





























































































































































            
Age    Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Height No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
            
Reduction (%) in original  
(Model C)  obesity penalty  
    16   43  98   -9    84  
Sibling fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes
R2  0.01 0.01  0.02  0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.05 
No of cases  145,193  145,193 145,193 145,193 145,193  145,193 145,193 145,193
Notes: This table reports estimates from the (2) regression model: Log Earnings = a + b*BMI_class + c*X + d*Missing info + f + e.  
Model A only includes BMI categories and age and is estimated using OLS for the sibling sample. Model B adds siblings fixed effects and Model C 
height. Model D adds cognitive skill, Model E non-cognitive skill, while Model F and G add the physical fitness variables. Model H adds all 
variables.    37
Table 4.3. The BMI estimates and different outcome measures. Siblings. Men 28-38 years old, 2003. Logarithm of annual earnings. 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi) 
Modell C: 



































































            
Modell H: 



































































            
Sibling fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No of cases  145,193  145,193  132,881  143,507  131,047  123,512 
Notes: Column (i) is the BMI estimates from Model C in Table 4.2, while Column (ii) and (iii) shows the BMI estimates for those with 
top coded earnings and earnings above 100’ SEK, respectively. Column (iv) and (v) gives the BMI estimates when excluding earnings 
subsidies and enlistment “fakers”, respectively. Finally, Column (vi) gives the BMI estimates when especially strong individuals are 
withdrawn from the sample, that is, those 1 standard deviation above average hand grip strength. It has been proposed that BMI might 
be a bad measure for individuals with a great muscular mass.     
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Appendix: 
 
  Table A1. Variable List 
Variable    Definition of the variable   
BMI  Measured at age 18 when enlisting. Calculated as a persons weight in kg divided by the square 
of his length in meters. 
Logarithm annual earnings  Annual earnings in 2003 from work or self-employment. Including subsidies. 
Age  In 2003. 28-38 years old. 
Parental characteristics: 
Fathers’ (log) earnings 
 
Annual earnings in 1980 from work or self-employment 
Mothers’ (log) earnings  Annual earnings in 1980 from work or self-employment 
Fathers years of schooling  Years of schooling, taking values from 9-18. Measured in 1999. 
Mothers years of schooling  Years of schooling, taking values from 9-18. Measured in 1999. 
Cognitive skill:  Measured at age 18 when enlisting. The enlistment test score on a scale 1-9. 
Non-cognitive skill:  Measured at age 18 when enlisting. Evaluated by a psychologist, on a scale 1-9. 
Physical fitness: 
Cardiovascular fitness 
Measured at age 18 when enlisting. During a 5-10 minute exercise it was measured the highest 
watts attained when riding on a stationary bike. This measure is then divided by the individuals 
weight in kilograms. 
Muscular strength  Measured at age 18 when enlisting. Handgrip strength of strongest hand. 
Height 
 
Measured at age 18 when enlisting.  
Missing information on: 
Fathers’ (log) earnings 
 
 
Takes a 1 if missing information on fathers’ log earnings and zero otherwise. If missing the 
mean of fathers’ log earnings is imputed.  
Mothers’ (log) earnings 
 
Takes a 1 if missing information on mothers’ log earnings and zero otherwise. If missing the 
mean of mothers’ log earnings is imputed. 
Fathers years of schooling 
 
Takes a 1 if missing information on fathers years of schooling and zero otherwise. If missing the 
mean of fathers years of schooling is imputed. 
Mothers years of schooling 
 
Takes a 1 if missing information on mothers’ years of schooling and zero otherwise. If missing 
the mean of mothers’ years of schooling is imputed. 
Maximum watts on stationary 
bike 
Takes a 1 if missing information on maximum watts on stationary bike and zero otherwise. If 
missing the mean of maximum watts on stationary bike is imputed. 
Handgrip strength 
 
Takes a 1 if missing information on handgrip strength and zero otherwise. If missing the mean of 
handgrip strength is imputed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 